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“Could I forget that precious half of the republic that assures the happiness of the other and 
whose sweetness and goodness maintain its peace and good morals?” (Jean-Jacques 





We restore women to development history and restore development history to women.1  In 
the past two centuries, we have witnessed per capita income growth takeoff (Industrial Revolution) 
and fertility decline (Demographic Revolution) in present-day developed countries across the 
global North.  On the other hand, such transitions took place later in today’s developing countries 
in the global South, contributing to the North-South income gap nowadays (Great Divergence).  
The two revolutions are of vital importance in shaping our lives in modern times, and the unified 
growth theories (Galor and Weil 2000; Galor and Moav 2002) have been devoted to the study of 
this issue.  However, the rise of feminism, one major event that went along with wealth 
amplification and demographic change in developed countries, has not been adequately addressed 
in the literature.  It is our central thesis that female empowerment and demographic-economic 
aggregates are integrated entities that co-evolve in a system throughout a nation’s development.  
We organize our thesis in three steps: (1) to develop a unified growth model with endogenous 
female empowerment; (2) to show that our model captures the long-run development patterns in 
France, a developed country today; and (3) to study the policy implications of our model on 
Madagascar, a developing country today. 
In section 4, to explore the interrelationship between women and development, we develop a 
unified growth model with endogenous female empowerment.  In the model, there are two 
sectors (agriculture and manufacturing) in the economy, where technological progresses are fueled 
by learning-by-doing externalities.  Each household consists of one wife and one husband, both 
of whom supply labor hours to earn wage income in the market.  Child-rearing requires both 
(agricultural) goods cost and wife’s time cost, and the wife desires fewer children than her husband.  
The wife and husband bargain within the household to make consumption and fertility decisions, 
and the wife’s bargaining power is determined endogenously from her wage income compared to 
her husband’s.  Our model captures the two-way relationship between women and development: 
in one direction, female empowerment would hamper fertility, move production factors out of 
agriculture and decelerate development.  In the other direction, development that checks fertility, 
such as wage increases and relative agricultural price rises, would raise female labor-force 
participation and hence women’s power. 
In section 5, we calibrate the model and simulate socio-demographic-economic development 
in France during AD1400-AD2100.  We pay particular attention to women’s economic history.  
Women have their own economic history that is distinctive from men’s.  Men’s economic history, 
like aggregate economic history, is characterized by income stagnation and subsequent takeoff.  
1 This is adapted from Kelly-Gadol (1976, 809)’s statement: “Women's history has a dual goal: to 
restore women to history and to restore our history to women.” 
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Women’s economic history, in contrast, is featured with first a fall and later a rapid rebound.  In 
the early stages of development, because production concentrates on agriculture, agricultural 
technological progress is fast relative to the manufacturing one, leading to declines in relative 
agricultural price and goods cost of child-rearing.  Fertility rises in response; women devote more 
time to raising children and withdraw from market work, implying a fall in women’s income.  As 
time goes by, the rising real wage that increases women’s time cost of child-rearing, together with 
structural transformation towards manufacturing that raises relative agricultural price, will depress 
fertility.  This will liberate women’s time for market work.  With substantive wage growth since 
industrialization, this implies a rapid rise in women’s income.  Female labor-force participation 
and women’s power also display similar U-shaped evolution patterns. 
The divergence between women and men’s economic history poses an important question to 
traditional unified growth theories regarding whose economic history they are paying attention to, 
and whether their implications fail to apply to one entire gender (see Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
quote ahead of the Introduction).  Besides reconciling the fall and rise of women, our simulation 
replicates two other distinctive features of the French development process: France did not go 
through a Post-Malthusian regime in its development.  Fertility control and innovation have 
played important roles in French modern economic growth. 
In section 6, the calibrated model also sheds light on how policies targeted at improving 
gender equality (World Bank 2012) and innovation processes (World Bank 2008; UNIDO 2013) 
affect development from a dynamic general equilibrium perspective.  We examine four 
development policies: preferential treatment, reducing child-rearing cost, promoting agricultural 
innovation and promoting manufacturing innovation in Madagascar, a former French colony.  We 
investigate whether the four policies accelerate economic development and improve gender 
equality in Madagascar in both the short and long run. 
The next section reviews the relevant literature.  Section 3 presents historical facts about 
French development.  Section 4 develops the unified growth model with female empowerment.  
Section 5 applies the model to reconcile French development history.  Section 6 studies the 
effects of the four aforementioned development policies on Madagascar.  Section 7 highlights 
some discussion.  Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
2 RELATED LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Unified growth theories 
Unified growth theories aim to explain the transitions of an economy throughout its 
development.  Particular attention has been paid to the transitions from per capita income 
stagnation to sustainable growth (Industrial Revolution) and from high to low fertility 
(Demographic Revolution).  Pioneering works include Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and 
Moav (2002).  They emphasized the three-regime development process: the inherent interaction 
between population (size or composition) and technology level in the Malthusian regime 
accelerates technological progress and eventually triggers the Industrial Revolution; the economy 
then enters the Post-Malthusian regime.  Sooner or later the demand for human capital will rise to 
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a level that, through child quality-quantity tradeoff, the Demographic Revolution will set in; the 
economy will then enter the Modern Growth regime. 
Unified growth theories have paid attention to the roles of human capital formation (Galor 
and Weil 2000; Galor and Moav 2002), physical capital accumulation (Galor and Weil 1996), 
inequality (Galor and Moav 2004; Galor et al. 2009), trade (Galor and Mountford 2006; 2008), 
mortality (Lagerlöf 2003a; Soares 2005), child labor laws (Hazan and Berdugo 2002; Doepke 
2004), structural transformation (Hansen and Prescott 2002; Strulik and Weisdorf 2008) and 
geography (Strulik 2008) in facilitating growth takeoff and demographic change.2  However, one 
important phenomenon that went along with the two transitions but has not been adequately 
addressed by the literature is the rise of feminism (Diebolt and Perrin 2016).  Becker (1991[1981], 
140) linked these three events together: 
“I believe that the growth in the earning power of women during the last hundred years in 
developed countries is a major cause of both the large increase in labor force participation of 
married women and the large decline in fertility.”  
Our unified growth model will encompass living standard, fertility, female labor-force 
participation and women’s power.  We will examine how the model reconciles historical 
socio-demographic-economic development in France (sections 5.1 and 5.4).3 
 
2.2 Women and Development 
We highlight some theoretical papers which studied the role of women in development.4  
Galor and Weil (1996) posited that an increase in capital-labor ratio in the economy will raise 
women’s relative wages, because capital is more complementary to women’s labor input than to 
men’s during the production process.  This will encourage female labor-force participation and 
reduce fertility, and in turn lead to a rise in capital-labor ratio again.  Such a loop can generate a 
demographic transition accompanied by accelerated output growth.  In Lagerlöf (2003b), as 
women’s human capital becomes more equal to men’s over time, their time turns more expensive.  
Spouses will respond by substituting child quality for child quantity, fertility will decline and per 
capita income growth rate will rise.   
The above models did not capture the change in women’s ability in making decisions (female 
empowerment).  Basu (2006), Rees and Riezman (2011) and Komura (2013) incorporated female 
empowerment in intra-household bargaining models without economic growth.  Basu (2006) 
emphasized that female labor supply is both a cause and a consequence of women’s changing 
power within the household.  The interaction between the two can lead to multiple equilibrium 
outcomes.  Hence an exogenous change in women’s wage can have a dramatic effect on female 
labor supply and women’s power.  Rees and Riezman (2011) suggested that, if globalization 
provides relatively more market opportunities for women, women’s power will rise.  Given that 
2 See Galor (2005) and Galor (2010) for surveys on unified growth theories. 
3 In our model, there are eight key endogenous socio-demographic-economic variables: two 
socio-variables: female labor-force participation rate and women’s power; one 
demographic-variable: fertility; five economic variables: per capita income, agricultural and 
manufacturing productivity growth rates, agricultural employment share and relative food price. 
4 See Duflo (2012) for an empirical survey on the bidirectional relationship between women 
empowerment and economic development. 
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women have a weaker preference for child quantity, fertility will fall.  Komura (2013) 
demonstrated that heterogeneity in spouses’ preferences for child quantity together with marriage 
market externality can generate multiple equilibrium outcomes on fertility and female 
empowerment, and studied the model’s implication on child allowance and childcare subsidies 
policies on fertility rate. 
Diebolt and Perrin (2013a, 2013b) were probably the first to incorporate female 
empowerment in a unified growth model, that captures the co-evolving nature of female 
empowerment and demographic-economic development.  They proposed a one-sector model with 
endogenous living standard, fertility, skill composition of population and gender equality.  When 
skill-biased technological progress occurs, returns to skilled human capital increase and will 
eventually incentivize women to acquire education.  Higher investment on women’s education 
will on the one hand raise the opportunity cost of having children, and reduce fertility; on the other 
hand it will improve gender equality.  Over time, the economy will move from an equilibrium 
with low income, high fertility, small fraction of skilled labor, and low gender equality to one with 
opposite features.  We will construct an alternative unified growth model with female 
empowerment that simulates the historical fall and rise of women’s power throughout the 
development process (sections 3.8 and 5.2), which is not featured in Diebolt and Perrin (2013a, 
2013b)’s model.5 
 
2.3 French Development Process 
We will apply our unified growth model to simulate French development process.  This 
contributes to the strand of literature that quantitatively applies unified growth theories to 
historical growth experience.  Some examples include Jones (2001), Hansen and Prescott (2002), 
Gollin et al. (2002, 2004, 2007), Lord and Rangazas (2006), Desmet and Parente (2012), 
O’Rourke et al. (2013) and Yang and Zhu (2013).  These works either applied unified growth 
models to British/United States or the world as a whole.6  We choose France because it is an 
important European power that has not received attention in parallel to Britain in the research of 
unified growth theories.  Also, the fact that France went through its Demographic Revolution 
before its Industrial Revolution (Chesnais 1992, ch.11) offers a development process that 
distinguishes from the British one and draws our interest (sections 5.1 and 5.3). 
Besides reconciling demographic and economic chronologies in France, our unified growth 
model simulates the U-shaped evolution of female labor-force participation (Goldin 1990, 1995; 
Mammen and Paxson 2000; Tam 2011).  In addition, we examine the impact of several 
development policies mentioned in the Introduction (section 6).  Similar work has been 
performed by Doepke (2004), who studied the effect of education subsidy and child labor 
restriction on fertility in Brazil, South Korea and England. 
 
5 See section 7.1 for a comparison of our model with Diebolt and Perrin (2013a, 2013b)’s one. 
6 One exception is Voigtländer and Voth (2006).  They showed that the higher initial per capita 
income in England, through raising capital-intensive manufacturing production and the scope of 
capital externality, explained England’s higher chance to escape from Malthusian constraints than 
China’s in the eighteenth century. 
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 3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND IN FRANCE 
 
In this section, we present the historical evolution of eight socio-demographic-economic 
variables that our unified growth model aims to capture: per capita income, fertility, agricultural 
and manufacturing productivities, agricultural employment share, relative food price, female 
labor-force participation rate and gender equality in France. 
 
3.1 Per capita income 
Figure 1 depicts Maddison (2008)’s estimates of per capita income (left) and its 10-year 
average growth rate (right) from AD1000 to AD2008.  There is a structural break in per capita 
income growth rate in AD1820.  We interpret it as the year that France began its Industrial 
Revolution.  The 10-year average per capita income growth rate during AD1821-AD1830 was 
0.55%.  We take it as the criterion for the occurrence of French Industrial Revolution. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 Weir (1997) also stated estimates for per capita income growth rate as 0.3% per annum in 
AD1750-AD1820 and 1.3% per annum in AD1820-AD1913.  Since AD1820, France has turned 
from a relatively stagnating economy to one with sustainable per capita income growth. 
 
3.2 Fertility 
Figure 2 (blue sold line) depicts Chesnais (1992) and Mitchell (2007)’s estimates of birth rate 
in France throughout AD1750-AD2003.  French birth rate started to decline in AD1786, around 
the time of AD1789 French Revolution.7  We take AD1780 as the year of French Demographic 
Revolution. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 Chesnais (1992, 333-335) listed three reasons accounting for the fertility decline: the 
revolution of ideas, the political climate and the agrarian question.  First, around the French 
Revolution, maternal feelings developed and children became the objects of attention.  Birth 
restriction became one chief instrument towards the “rationalization of sexual life”.  Second, 
since the turn of the nineteenth century, France witnessed the death of over a million men during 
the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, creating a sense of deadlock in the country.  Third, 
“France had for some time been a populous land, cultivated and cleared to its last corners.  High 
demographic growth during the whole of the eighteenth century only exacerbated the food 
problem”, catalyzing the change in demographic regime.  We will focus on the third factor in this 
paper.8 
 
3.3 Agricultural productivity 
7 Cummins (2013) placed the time of French demographic transition in AD1776. 
8 We will not consider individual preference change and mortality decline as causes of fertility 
decline in our model.  Figure 1 (red dotted line) depicts the death rate in France during 
AD1750-AD2003.  During the nineteenth century when fertility declined, mortality stayed 
roughly constant (except during the Franco-Prussian War in AD1870-AD1871). 
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Figure 3 depicts Dennison and Simpson (2010)’s estimates of agricultural productivity level 
in France during AD1600-AD1800.  In general agricultural productivity was improving.9 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
Allen (2003, 409) stated that rising agricultural productivity promoted economic 
development in early Modern Europe through three channels: (1) supplying food, wool and flax to 
support the non-agricultural sector, (2) releasing labor to the manufacturing sector, and (3) 
providing surplus to finance investment.  Our model captures the first two channels. 
 
3.4 Manufacturing productivity 
Figure 4 depicts Mitchell (2007)’s estimates of real money wages in Industry in France 
during AD1800-AD1913.  We use them as proxies for the manufacturing productivity levels in 
France during the corresponding time frame.  Manufacturing productivity was in general rising.10 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
3.5 Agricultural employment share 
Figure 5 depicts Allen (2000) and Mathias and Todorov (2005)’s estimates of agricultural 
employment share in France from AD1750 to AD1992.  Agricultural employment share was 
declining throughout this period.11 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE 
 The pace of industrialization was slower in France than in Britain.  By AD1870, the British 
agricultural employment share had fallen to 23%, compared to 49% in France (Mathias and 
Todorov 2005, 91).  Henderson (1967, ch.IV(ii)) stated that one reason for this was the slow 
population growth in France relative to Britain during the nineteenth century, which limited the 
size of the home market that French manufacturing sector could sell its goods to.12  On the other 
hand, after the Napoleonic Wars, Britain captured a large share of the world supply of international 
services (Crouzet 2003, 235-236). 
 
3.6 Relative food price 
9  The French Revolution had probably accelerated agricultural productivity growth.  It 
introduced a unified system of assigned property rights, spurring investment in agricultural 
technological innovation.  The introduction of potatoes (Dennison and Simpson 2010) and the 
development of sugar beets (Jodidi 1911) occurred around the same time. 
10 There have been debates about the performance of French industry in the nineteenth century.  
The earlier view among economic historians was that the French industry was relatively backward 
(Kindleberger 1964; Landes 1969), and its labor productivity failed to catch up with Britain’s 
(Dormois 2004).  The revisionist historians argued that French industrial labor productivity was 
higher than Britain’s in most of the nineteenth century (O’Brien and Keyder 1978, 91), and the 
French economy performed very well when compared to other industrializing nations (Cameron 
and Freedeman 1983). 
11  Kuznets (1966, 88-89) provided estimates of agricultural income share in France from 
AD1789/1815 to AD1962.  The share declined from 50% to 9%, again showing the relative 
decline of French agriculture within the time frame. 
12 Henderson (1967) also mentioned that the highly centralized French administration system, loss 
of Lorraine during the Franco-Prussian War, slow construction of French railway and port systems, 
failure to attract sufficient capital, slow development of mass production techniques and industrial 
protection from foreign competition also contributed to the slow French industrialization. 
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Figure 6 depicts Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1985) and INSEE (2016)’s estimates of 
relative food price (agricultural price over industrial price) in France during AD1820-AD1992.  
Relative food price was in general rising throughout AD1820-AD1913.   
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE 
Comparing Figure 6 with Figure 2, we hypothesize that the rising relative food price was one 
reason underlying the fertility decline during AD1820-AD1913.  Malthus (1826, 18) stated that, 
during the season of distress (falling price of labor and rising food price), “the discouragements to 
marriage and the difficulty of rearing a family are so great, that the progress of population is 
retarded”.13 
 
3.7 Female labor-force participation rate  
For the early Modern Period, Davis (1975, 94) stated that,  
“[French] women suffered for their powerlessness in both Catholic and Protestant lands in 
the late sixteenth to eighteenth centuries as changes in marriage laws restricted the freedoms 
of wives even further, as female guilds dwindled, as the female role in middle-level 
commerce and farm direction contracted, and as the differential between male and female 
wages increased”. 
Female labor-force participation rate probably went down in those three centuries.  Since the 
mid-nineteenth century, we have such estimates.  Figure 7 depicts Deldycke et al. (1969) and the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2016)’s estimates of female labor-force participation rate in 
France during AD1856-AD2012, which was in general rising. 
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE 
We hypothesize that the increase in female labor-force participation rate was both a cause 
and a consequence of the fertility decline.  On the one hand, the increase in female labor-force 
participation rate raised women’s income relative to men’s, improving their bargaining position 
within household.  Given that women desire fewer children than men, fertility fell.  On the other 
hand, the fertility decline liberated women’s time into market work. 
 
3.8 Gender equality 
Kelly-Gadol (1977; 1982, 23) stated that, in early Modern France, state formation promoted 
the emergence of “the preindustrial, patriarchal household as the basic social unit, as well as the 
economic unit of postfeudal society”, eroding women’s power before the French Revolution.  
Norberg (2004, 266) also mentioned that, women of the Old Regime in France had a “history of 
exclusion and steadily diminishing opportunities”. 
The French Revolution was a hallmark of French feminism.  The AD1789 Women’s March 
on Versailles (October Days) was one of the most important events in the French Revolution, 
showing that “the collective power of women was emerging” (Moses 1984, 12).  Two years 
following the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the Declaration of the Rights of 
Woman and the Female Citizen was published in AD1791 to express the failure of the French 
13 Malthus (1826, 12) also stated that, “[t]he ultimate cheek to population appears then to be a 




                                                      
Revolution to address the gender equality issue.  In essence, the latter declaration was an 
imitation of the former except highlighting the role of women; for example, in response to the first 
sentence in the former declaration, “Men are born free and equal in rights”, the latter reads 
“Women are born free and equal to men in rights”.  In AD1791, the Revolutionary Constitution 
recognized marriage as a civil contract between consenting spouses (Rose 1995, 198).  In 
AD1793 the Convention extended equal inheritance rights in all kinds of properties to all offspring, 
regardless of sex or birth order (Desan 1997, 598).  The French Revolution set the stage for the 
continuous feminist movement in the nineteenth century, such as the demands for the right to 
participation in the government, the right to work, the right to equality in marriage, and so forth. 
(Moses 1984, 14-15).   
We take literacy rate as a simple indicator of gender equality.  Davis (1975, 72) mentioned 
that there was a “dramatic drop” in education level and of mere literacy among city women in 
early Modern France.  Figure 8 depicts Diebolt and Perrin (2013a) and the World Bank (2016)’s 
estimates of female-to-male enrollment rate in primary school in France from AD1837 to AD2012, 
which was in general rising.  We take the above together as evidence of a fall and rise in women’s 
power throughout the French history.14 
INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE 
 
Now we have reviewed the important socio-demographic-economic trends in French 
development history (Figures 1-8).  In the coming section we will construct a unified growth 
model that can broadly replicate these trends. 
 
 
4 THE MODEL 
 
We extend Strulik and Weisdorf (2008)’s unified growth model to incorporate 
intra-household bargaining (Basu 2006).  Consider an overlapping generation economy where its 
economic activities continue over infinite discrete time periods, indexed by 𝑡𝑡.  Each individual 
lives for two stages: childhood and adulthood.  There are two groups of individuals: “female” 
(denoted by 𝑖𝑖 = 1) and “male” (denoted by 𝑖𝑖 = 2) with equal size.  Although preferences differ 
across the two groups, individual preferences are identical within each group.  An adult female 
(“woman” or “wife”) and an adult male (“man” or “husband”) form a household and jointly make 
consumption and fertility decisions.  In the process the wife and the husband resolve their 
preference conflicts through cooperative bargaining.  The economy produces two goods: 
agricultural goods (food) and manufacturing goods.  The former is for child-rearing while the 
latter is for adult consumption. 
 
14 Starting from AD2006, the World Economic Forum has been publishing the Global Gender Gap 
Index, which assesses gender equality based on four areas: economic participation and opportunity, 
education attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment.  The index ranges from 
zero to one scale.  The Global Gender Gap Index for France rose from 0.6520 to 0.761 over 
AD2006-AD2015 (World Economic Forum 2006, 2015). 
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4.1 Households 
Consider a generation-𝑡𝑡 individual, in the first stage of his/her life (time 𝑡𝑡 − 1), he/she does 
not work and makes no choice.  To survive to adulthood, he/she consumes one unit of agricultural 
goods, which is paid by his/her parents, and a fraction 𝜑𝜑 ∈ (0, 1) of his/her mother’s time.  In 
the second stage of his/her life (time 𝑡𝑡), he/she marries.   A woman (wife) and a man (husband) 
form a household.  They are each endowed with one unit of time, which can be supplied to the 
market to earn wage income; a fraction 𝜑𝜑 of a wife’s time is devoted to rear each of her child.  
The wife and husband will combine their wage incomes to purchase manufacturing goods for their 
own consumption, and food to feed their children. 15 
Preference of a generation-𝑡𝑡 individual is defined over his/her household’s manufacturing 
goods consumption 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡, and the number of children 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 during adulthood.  Women and men’s 
individual utility functions, 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡1 and 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡2, are respectively: 16 
(1)  𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡1 = 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + γ1 log𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ;  𝛾𝛾1 > 0 ; 
(2)  𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡2 = 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + γ2 log𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ;  𝛾𝛾2 > 0 . 
Note that individuals’ childhood food consumption does not enter the utility functions.  (We 
might think of this as utility derived from childhood food consumption being normalized to zero.) 
Trivers (1972) proposed that, the inherent biological imbalance in breeding cost and 
male-male competition to fertilize more sex cells create male-female conflict over child quality 
versus child quantity - men desire more children than women.  Population surveys on the ideal 
number of children in Africa tended to support Trivers hypothesis (Short and Kiros 2002; 
Gebreselassie 2008; Westoff 2010).  We make assumption (A1) to capture this preference 
difference: 17 
(A1)  𝛾𝛾1 < 𝛾𝛾2 . 
So, in our model, women and men have two inherent biological differences: first, women bear the 
entire time cost of child-rearing within household; second, women have a weaker reproductive 
preference for number of children. 
Each household maximizes a household welfare function 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡, which is a weighted average of 
the wife and husband’s individual utility functions (1) and (2): 
(3)  𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡1 + (1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡)𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡2 ;  
where 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0, 1]  is a measure of women’s power at time 𝑡𝑡 : the higher 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡  is, the more 
bargaining power the wife has within the household’s decision making process.  In the extreme 
cases, if 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 = 1 , household’s decisions always conform to wife’s preference. 18  If 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 = 0, 
household’s decisions are always in line with husband’s individual choices. 
 The household chooses manufacturing goods consumption and number of children to 
15 We assume adults have no demand for food.  We might think of this as children storing some 
of their food for adulthood.  Letting adults demand food would not change the qualitative results. 
16 We adopt the quasi-linear description of utility function, which provides the strongest form of a 
hierarchy of needs (Strulik and Weisdorf 2008).  As wage increases, the adults will spend a 
higher income fraction on manufacturing goods consumption. 
17 Komura (2013, 952) stated that, “[i]t is quite natural that women would hesitate to have many 
children in comparison to men considering their physical and mental strain attendant upon the 
frequent childbirth and the fact that the longer period of childrearing is likely to narrow the range 
of women’s occupational choices.” 
18 In our model, the maximum value 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 can take is 0.5.  This is directly implied from (6). 
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maximize 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡  subject to a budget constraint.  The total wage income of a generation- 𝑡𝑡 
household is [1 + (1 − 𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡)]𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 = (2 − 𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡)𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡, where 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 is the market wage rate at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝜑𝜑 
is time cost per child (Galor and Weil 1996).  Since leisure has no value in our model, the 
husband will always supply one unit of time to the market, while the wife will supply all her time 
aside from child-rearing to the market.  The household divides the total wage income into 
purchase of manufacturing and agricultural goods.  We make the price of manufacturing goods 
the numéraire in the economy for all time periods, and let 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 be the price of agricultural goods 
relative to manufacturing goods (relative food price) at time 𝑡𝑡.  The budget constraint for a 
generation-𝑡𝑡 household is: 
(4)  𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = (2 − 𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡)𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 . 
 Maximizing (3) subject to (4) gives the optimal household fertility choice: 
(5)  𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = γ2+(γ1−γ2)𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝜑𝜑𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡+𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  . 
Fertility decreases with women’s power (given 𝛾𝛾1 < 𝛾𝛾2), market wage rate and relative food price. 
We assume that the relative power between wife and husband depends on their relative wage 
income.  This corresponds to Engels (1909[1902], 99)’s assertion that the “supremacy of man in 
marriage is simply the consequence of his economic superiority”.19  In our model, wives and 
husbands are price takers in the labor market.  There is no sex discrimination and they face the 
same market wage rate. 20  Therefore the relative wage income between wife and husband equals 





  or  𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 = 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡1+𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ; 
where 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 is female labor-force participation rate at time 𝑡𝑡.  It equals the amount of time 
each wife supplies to the market: 
(7)  𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 1 − 𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 . 
Household equilibrium (Basu 2006) will be attained when (5)-(7) hold in the economy. 
 
4.2 Population dynamics 
At each time 𝑡𝑡, a generation consists of 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 adults, where half of them are women 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡1 and 
the other half are men 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡2:21 
(8)  𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡1 + 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡2 . 
The initial populations of women and men, 𝐹𝐹11  and 𝐹𝐹12 , are historically given. 
19 This is similar to Komura (2013): women’s bargaining power within household depends on 
women’s income relative to men’s.  Folbre (1983, 272) stated that, “differences in women's and 
men's access to wealth and income reduce the economic bargaining power of individual women 
within the family, thus making it possible for husbands to impose their own family size decisions 
on wives”. 
20 Historically, sex discrimination in the labor market did exist.  Even up until the twentieth 
century, “women’s employments remain[ed] concentrated in sectors requiring few qualifications, 
in the continuity of domestic labor, and offering low wages.” (Diebolt and Perrin 2013a, 17).  In 
this paper, we abstract from this issue and focus on the interaction between fertility, female 
labor-force participation and women’s power. 
21 In other words, at each time 𝑡𝑡, half of the newborns are female and half are male. 
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 Adult population grows at gross rate 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
2
:22 
(9)  𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡2 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 . 











− 1 . 
Note that 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 ∙
𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
2
 is the number of children at time 𝑡𝑡. 
 
4.3 Production 
There are two production sectors in the economy: agricultural and manufacturing sectors.  
Technological progresses are fueled by learning-by-doing externality (Arrow 1962; Matsuyama 
1992). 
4.3.1 The Agricultural sector 
At each time 𝑡𝑡, agricultural goods (food) are produced according to a Cobb-Douglas 
technology, using labor hours and land as inputs: 
(11)  𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝜇𝜇(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼(𝑇𝑇)1−𝛼𝛼 ; 𝜇𝜇 > 0, 𝜀𝜀 ∈ (0,1), 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0,1) , 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 is agricultural productivity or agricultural technology level at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 is labor 
hours employed by the agricultural sector at time t, both of which are endogenously determined.  
We assume total amount of land to be fixed and normalize it to one: 𝑇𝑇 = 1 for all time 𝑡𝑡.  The 
parameter restriction 𝛼𝛼  ∈ (0,1)  entails diminishing returns to labor hours in agricultural 
production. 
 We assume a simple one-to-one form of agricultural technological progress originating from 
learning-by-doing during agricultural production: 
(12)  𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝜇𝜇(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼 . 
The restriction 𝜀𝜀 ∈ (0,1) asserts diminishing returns to learning in the agricultural sector. 
 The agricultural productivity growth rate at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴, is defined as: 
(13)  𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 ≡
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1−𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡
= 𝜇𝜇(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀−1(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼 . 
The higher the agricultural technology level is, the slower the agricultural productivity growth rate 
would be.  The labor hours employed by the agricultural sector exert a positive scale effect on 
agricultural technological progress. 
 
4.3.2 The Manufacturing sector 
At each time 𝑡𝑡, manufacturing goods are produced according to a constant-to-returns 
technology, using labor hours as the sole input:  
(14)  𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 = 𝛿𝛿(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 ; 𝛿𝛿 > 0, 𝜙𝜙 ∈ (0,1),  
where 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 is manufacturing productivity or manufacturing technology level at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 is 
labor hours employed by the manufacturing sector at time t, both of which are endogenously 
determined.  There are no diminishing returns to labor hours in manufacturing production. 
22 Each household chooses fertility 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡.  Since each household contains two adults, on average 





                                                      
 Similar to the agricultural sector, we assume a simple one-to-one learning-by-doing mapping 
of manufacturing technological progress to manufacturing output: 
(15)  𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 −𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 = 𝛿𝛿(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 . 
The restriction 𝜙𝜙 ∈ (0,1) assures diminishing returns to learning in the manufacturing sector. 
The manufacturing productivity growth rate at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀, is defined as: 
(16)  𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 ≡
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1−𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
= 𝛿𝛿(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙−1𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 . 
Again, a higher manufacturing technology base would slow down manufacturing productivity 
growth.  The manufacturing employed labor hours exert a positive scale effect on manufacturing 
technological progress. 
 
4.3.3 Aggregate output 
The aggregate output at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡, equals the sum of values of agricultural output at time 𝑡𝑡, 
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴, and of manufacturing output at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀: 
(17)  𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 . 
Note that the price of manufacturing output has been normalized to one in all time periods. 
Per capita income at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, is defined as: 






Per capita income growth rate at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡







4.4 Market clearing 
We impose three market clearing conditions to close the model: 
4.4.1 Labor market clearing 
At each time 𝑡𝑡, the labor hours employed by the agricultural and manufacturing sectors 
equal the aggregate labor hours supplied by the adults: 
(20)  𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 + 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 = 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 �2−𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡2 � . 
Note that �2−𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
2
� is the fraction of time endowment supplied to market work per household. 
 
4.4.2 Food market clearing 
At each time 𝑡𝑡, the food demand for child-rearing purpose equals the agricultural output: 
𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
2
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼.  We define 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 as the agricultural employment share (share of labor hours 
devoted to agriculture) at time 𝑡𝑡.  Manipulating the above food market clearing condition gives: 














The agricultural employment share is increasing in fertility and population size, and is decreasing 




4.4.3 Wage equalization 
At each time 𝑡𝑡, we assume labor hours to be perfectly mobile across the agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors.  Hence wage 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 will be equalized across the two sectors.  We further 
assume that the wage in each sector is set to the average product of labor hours:23 
(22)  𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 . 
 Using (14) and (22), we obtain the wage equation: 
(23)  𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙 . 
Wage increases with manufacturing productivity. 
 Using the food market equilibrium condition with the second equality in (22), we obtain the 
relative food price equation: 
(24)  𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙[𝜇𝜇(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀]1𝛼𝛼 ∙ �𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡2 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡�1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼  . 
Relative food price increases with fertility, population size and manufacturing productivity; it 
decreases with agricultural productivity. 
 
4.5 Equilibrium prices and allocations 
The first period of the model is indexed with 𝑡𝑡 = 1, and the initial conditions are given by {𝐹𝐹11 ,𝐹𝐹12 ,𝐴𝐴1,𝑀𝑀1}.  The equilibrium constitutes sequences of household allocations {𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡, 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡}𝑡𝑡=1∞ , 
female variables {𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡}𝑡𝑡=1∞ , production variables {𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 ,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 ,𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡}𝑡𝑡=1∞ , population variables {𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡, 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+11 ,𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+12 }𝑡𝑡=1∞ , sectoral variables {𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡,𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴,𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀}𝑡𝑡=1∞ , price variables {𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡}𝑡𝑡=1∞ , technology 
levels {𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1,𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1}𝑡𝑡=1∞ , and growth rates �𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝,𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴,𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 ,𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡=1∞  which satisfy: 
 (i) utility maximization conditions (4), (5); 
 (ii) female bargaining conditions (6), (7); 
 (iii) production equations (11), (14), (17), (18); 
 (iv) market clearing conditions – labor market (20), food market (21), wage equalization 
(23), (24); 
 (v) population evolution (8), (9), with 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡1 and 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡2 grow at 
𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
2
  ∀𝑡𝑡; 
 (vi) technology evolution (12), (15); 
 (vii) growth rate definitions (10), (13), (16), (19). 
 
4.6 Adjustment mechanisms, and Bidirectional relationship between women and 
development 
We highlight five key adjustment mechanisms in the model, namely the income effect 
(Kongsamut et al. 2001), relative price effect, technology growth effect (Ngai and Pissarides 2007), 
population growth effect (Ho 2016a), and female empowerment effect: 
4.6.1 Income effect [Mechanism 1]24 
23 This is a type of “share economy” described by Drazen and Eckstei (1988, 437), where sectoral 
incomes are distributed among the working force. 
24 To be more precise, in our model with heterogeneous agents, Mechanism 1 should be called 
“Wage effect” instead of “Income effect”. 
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 Mechanism:  𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 ↑ => 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ↓, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 ↑, 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 ↓ 
 Proof: Holding 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 and 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 constant, by (5) an increase in 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 lowers 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡.  Then by (4) 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 
rises.  Holding 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 and 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 constant, by (21) 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 decreases. 
 This mechanism works through household optimization channel and food market clearing.  
A rise in wage will increase wives’ time cost of raising children.  Households will respond 
by giving fewer births.25  Female labor-force participation and household income will rise.  
Each household will spend more on manufacturing goods, and agricultural employment 
share will fall. 
 
4.6.2 Relative price effect [Mechanism 2] 
 Mechanism:  𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 ↑ => 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ↓, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 ↑, 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 ↓ 
 Proof: Holding 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 and 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 constant, by (5) an increase in 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 lowers 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡.  Then by (4) 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 
increases.  Holding 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 and 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 constant, by (21) 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 falls. 
 This mechanism also works through household optimization channel and food market 
clearing.  Facing an increase in relative food price, household will substitute manufacturing 
goods for children.  A smaller fraction of the economy’s labor hours will be required to 
produce food for children. 
 
4.6.3 Technology growth effect [Mechanism 3] 
 Mechanism:  𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ↑ =>  𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 ↑ ;  𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 ↑ =>  𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 ↓ 
 Proof: Using (11) and (14), rewrite (22) as 
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀 ∙ (𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼 = 𝛿𝛿(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀 ∙ �𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 �2−𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡2 ��1−𝛼𝛼 .  Holding 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 , 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 , 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡  and 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 
constant, an increase in 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 raises 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡.  Similarly, holding 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡, 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡, 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 and 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 constant, an 
increase in 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 reduces 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡. 
 This mechanism works through wage equalization.  Without loss of generality, consider a 
rise in agricultural productivity.  It exerts an upward pressure on agricultural wage.  
Ceteris paribus, labor hours will shift to the agricultural sector to maintain wage parity 
between the two sectors. 
 
4.6.4 Population growth effect [Mechanism 4]26 
 Mechanism:  𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 �
2−𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
2
� ↑ =>  𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 ↓ 
 Proof: Again from the proof in Mechanism 3, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀 ∙ �𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 �2−𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡2 ��1−𝛼𝛼.  Holding 
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡, 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 and 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 constant, an increase in 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 �
2−𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
2
� leads to a fall in 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡. 
 This mechanism also works through wage equalization.  Agricultural production is 
25 Our quasi-linear utility formulations (1) and (2) have the implication that, if 𝜑𝜑 = 0, then wage 
change will have no effect on household fertility (equation (5)). 
26 To be more precise, in our model with adjustable working hours, Mechanism 4 should be called 
“Labor hours growth effect” instead of “Population growth effect”. 
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characterized by stronger diminishing returns to labor hours than manufacturing production.  
Ceteris paribus, an increase in aggregate labor hours supplied will exert a greater downward 
pressure on agricultural wage than on manufacturing wage.  Labor hours will shift out of 
agriculture to relieve this pressure. 
 
4.6.5 Female empowerment effect [Mechanism 5] 
 Mechanism:  𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 ↑ => 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ↓, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 ↑, 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 ↓ 
 Proof: Holding 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 and 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 constant, by (5) an increase in 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 lowers 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡, given 𝛾𝛾1 < 𝛾𝛾2.  
Then by (4) 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 increases.  Holding 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 and 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 constant, by (21) 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 decreases. 
 This mechanism again works through household optimization channel and food market 
clearing.  As women’s bargaining power increases, household’s consumption and fertility 
choices resemble more the outcomes that women would choose alone.  Given women 
desire fewer children than men, this will reduce the number of births chosen by the 
household.  More household budget will be spent on manufacturing goods, and agricultural 
employment share will decrease. 
 
Coming to our key questions, first, how do women affect development?  The female 
empowerment effect [Mechanism 5] provides a channel through which women’s power (a social 
factor) can affect demography and economy.  In our model, given two biological asymmetries 
between women and men– women desiring fewer children and bearing the full time cost of rearing 
children – female empowerment would reduce fertility and agricultural employment share.  This 
contributes to the fields of “bio-founded” approach to family economics (Cox 2007, 105), feminist 
theory (Chafetz 1997; Upadhyay et al. 2014) as well as economic structural transformation 
(Kongsamut et al. 2001; Ngai and Pissarides 2007; Acemoglu and Guerrieri 2008).  Note that our 
model denies that one gender is endowed with relatively more physical/human capital (Galor and 
Weil 1996) or blessed with a comparative advantage in performing tasks in a certain sector (Ngai 
and Petrongolo 2015).  In other words, we have implicitly assumed the nonexistence of “essential 
difference” in women and men’s abilities – women and men are “born equal” from this 
perspective. 
Second, how does development affect women?  Wage increase (Becker 1991[1981]), 
relative food price rise (Malthus 1826) and female empowerment are three aggregate 
socio-economic developments that check fertility [Mechanisms 1, 2, 5].  They will raise female 
labor-force participation and (further) improve women’s power. 27   This completes the 
bidirectional relationship between women and development in our model.  In the next section we 
will examine how the above mechanisms and bidirectional relationship account for the French 
development process and women’s economic history. 
 
 
5 SIMULATION: FRENCH DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
 
27 See sections 2.1 and 3.6 for Becker and Malthus’ quotes. 
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In this section, we employ the unified growth model to replicate French long-run 
development trends documented in section 3.  Our emphases are to restore the role of women in 
French development process (section 5.1), and to show the distinction between women and men’s 
economic history (section 5.2).  We consider a model economy which begins in AD1400 and 
ends in AD2100.28  Each model period corresponds to 20 years.   
 
5.1 Benchmark model: Restoring women in French development process 
Table 1 shows the benchmark parameter values and initial conditions. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
These values are selected to yield transitional dynamics which are consistent with French 
development patterns in AD1400-AD2000, as listed in Table 2.29 
. INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Figure 9 (blue solid lines) depicts the simulated development paths for (a) per capita income 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, (b) fertility 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡, (c) agricultural productivity growth rate  𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴, (d) manufacturing productivity 
growth rate  𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀, (e) agricultural employment share 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡, (f) relative food price 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡, (g) female 
labor-force participation rate 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 , and (h) women’s power 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡  from AD1400 to AD2100.  
Panels (a) to (h) correspond to and are broadly consistent with Figures 1-8 in section 3. 
INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE 
The model economy starts with low per capita income, respectable fertility, slow agricultural 
and manufacturing productivity growth, high agricultural employment share, and high relative 
food price in AD1400.  Prior to AD1780, France was characterized by per capita income 
stagnation and rising fertility.  Since AD1780, it has experienced sustainable per capita income 
growth and fertility decline (up till around AD2000).  We denote periods prior to AD1780 as the 
“Malthusian era”, the periods thereafter as the “Modern Growth era”. 
During the Malthusian era (AD1400-AD1780), the initial small French population and 
sectoral technology bases brought about slow technological progresses (panels (c) and (d)).  Due 
to the initially high agricultural employment share, agricultural technological progress was fast 
relative to manufacturing technological progress, and pulled down the relative food price (panel 
(f)).  Through the relative price effect [Mechanism 2] household fertility rose (panel (b)).  This 
brought along two effects.  First was the Iron Law of Wages (Ricardo 1821): the rise in fertility 
dissipated productivity growth so that French per capita income remained at a roughly constant 
level (panel (a)).  Second was the diminished contribution of women to the labor force as they 
devoted more time to child-rearing, hampering their bargaining position within household up till 
AD1780 (panels (g) and (h)).  For agricultural employment share, before AD1700, it stayed 
28 We choose AD1400 as the starting year of simulation.  This is to avoid the period of the Black 
Death in the mid-fourteenth century, which might have significantly affected 
demographic-economic development in European countries (Ho 2016b).  Also, France has in 
general possessed territorial integrity since the end of Hundred Years War in AD1453. 
29 We manually adjusted 𝜑𝜑, 𝛾𝛾1, 𝛾𝛾2, 𝜇𝜇, 𝜀𝜀, 𝛼𝛼, 𝛿𝛿, 𝜙𝜙 and 𝑀𝑀1 to match the timings of Industrial 
and Demographic Revolutions, agricultural employment share in AD1760, female labor-force 
participation rate in AD1860, and the rise in relative food price in five consecutive periods (Table 
2.2).  We also set initial population and agricultural technologies so that Matlab can solve for real 
solution paths for the whole simulation time frame. 
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roughly constant (panel (e)).  After AD1700, agricultural technology had stockpiled to a 
sufficiently high level to feed the population, so labor hours could be released from agriculture.30  
Agricultural employment share declined (panel (e)). 
In AD1780, owing to the accelerated technological progresses, per capita income growth 
turned from negative to positive.  Through the income effect [Mechanism 1], fertility reverted its 
heretofore rising trend in AD1780, marking the French Demographic Revolution and the onset of 
the Modern Growth era (panel (b)).  Since AD1780, a virtuous cycle between fertility decline and 
female empowerment began.  On the one hand, the fertility decline has liberated women’s time 
from child-rearing to market work, improving their income and bargaining position within family.  
On the other hand, the rise in women’s power has reduced fertility through the female 
empowerment effect [Mechanism 5].  Therefore, AD1780 did not just mark the Demographic 
Revolution, but also the Rise of Women (panel (h)).  The Malthusian-Modern Growth boundary 
demarcated women’s turning point. 
The continuous fertility decline further accelerated per capita income growth after the turn of 
the nineteenth century (panel (a)).  By construction, AD1820 was the year of French Industrial 
Revolution when the model’s simulated per capita income growth rate rose significantly above 
zero.31 
There were two other events that added impetus to French economic growth during the 
nineteenth century.  The first was the rise in relative food price during AD1820-AD1920 (panel 
(f)), originating from population growth and acceleration of manufacturing technological progress 
(equation (24)).  Through the relative price effect [Mechanism 2] this contributed further to the 
fertility decline, as well as further raising female labor-force participation rate and output growth.  
The second was structural transformation: wage increase, relative food price rise, manufacturing 
technological progress, population growth and female empowerment [Mechanisms 1-5] all pushed 
labor hours towards the manufacturing sector during AD1820-AD1920 (panel (e)).  As 
production was shifting from the sector with slower technological progress (agricultural sector) to 
the faster one (manufacturing sector), overall productivity growth in the economy speeded up.32  
These two events boosted per capita income growth in France. 
The diminishing returns to learning destined the deceleration of sectoral technological 
progresses.  Also, the re-drop in relative food price together with the slowdown of structural 
transformation led to the retardation of per capita income growth during the twentieth century.33  
Without engines of growth other than learning-by-doing, per capita income, female labor-force 
participation rate and women’s power would stabilize around higher steady state values in the 
30 This works through a mechanism not highlighted in section 4.6: when agricultural technology 
progresses fast relative to population growth, labor hours can be released from the agricultural 
sector (equation (21)).  We might call this the “food problem channel”. 
31 Note that positive model-simulated per capita income growth was already in place after 
AD1780.  AD1820 was when the French economy decisively transited from stagnation to 
respectable growth (section 3.1). 
32 From our simulation, after AD1840, the manufacturing productivity growth rate has always 
been greater than the agricultural productivity growth rate. 
33 From our simulation, the agricultural and manufacturing productivity growth slowed down in 




                                                      
twenty-first century.  Productivity growth in the two sectors and agricultural employment share 
would converge to zero, and fertility would converge to replacement level.34 
To summarize the benchmark model, we have restored the role of women in French 
development process.  Women affected development through the female empowerment effect; in 
particular after AD1780 female empowerment added impetus to fertility decline and structural 
transformation.  Aggregate socio-economic development – wage increase, relative food price rise 
and Rise of Women after AD1780 – reduced fertility and liberated women’s time to market work, 
(further) improving their power in modern times (section 4.6).  The opposites were true before 
AD1780.  Hence, throughout history, female labor-force participation and women’s power 
displayed U-shaped evolution patterns (panels (g) and (h)).  One drawback of the benchmark 
model is that per capita income growth would run out of gas in the twenty-first century.  We will 
address this issue in section 5.4. 
 
5.2 Women’s economic history versus Men’s economic history 
Women’s economic history differs from men’s.  We first restore economic history to women 
and men.  Figure 10 depicts the simulated women’s wage income (panel (a)) and men’s wage 
income (panel (b)) throughout French development.  Men’s wage income is characterized by a 
stagnation followed by a sustainable growth since AD1780, replicating the evolution pattern of per 
capita income in the aggregate economy (panel (c)).35  Hence aggregate economic history, where 
Malthusian stagnation is followed by sustainable growth (Clark 2007), can represent men’s 
economic history. 
INSERT FIGURE 10 HERE 
 However, the same cannot be said for women’s economic history.  Observing from Figure 
10 (panel (a)), that women’s wage income is featured with a decay rather than stagnation in the 
early stages of development.  This is caused by wage stagnation together with women’s falling 
labor-force participation in the Malthusian era.  Things went on the opposite way after 
industrialization.  After AD1780, while men’s economic history is characterized with wage 
amplification, women’s one is with wage amplification and rise in participation.  Therefore 
women’s income has been rising faster than men’s in the Modern Growth era.  To summarize the 
two eras, aggregate economic history cannot represent women’s economic history. 
This poses an important question on traditional unified growth theories (Galor and Weil 
2000; Galor and Moav 2002): whose economic history are the theories capturing?  Can their 
implications be applied to both genders?  Constituting half of the human race, women’s economic 
history is too significant to be ignored by “unified” growth theories or economic history (or 
“herstory”).36 
34 See Appendix 1 for the derivation of the properties of the benchmark economy in its balanced 
growth path. 
35 To be more precise, in the Malthusian era, the simulated men’s income followed a mild rise, 
while the simulated per capita income followed a mild decline. 
36 Note that if we turn our attention to economic history from the angle of labor-force participation, 
women’s economic history (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡) is also distinctive from men’s one (always 1), but now the 
aggregate economic history (1 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡) represents women’s instead of men’s economic history.  
In the same vein, it is almost from definition that women’s social history (reflected by 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 in our 
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In our theory, the fall and rise of women’s status also applies to female labor-force 
participation and women’s power, which are also endogenously determined. 37   Our work 
complements the literature to explain the falling portion of those U-shaped evolution patterns: 
spouses’ intra-household bargaining together with evolving economic environment, rather than the 
social stigma against women working outside home (Goldin 1990, 1995) or state formation 
eroding women’s authority (Kelly-Gadol 1977, 1982), could predict the fall in women’s 
labor-force participation and power during the early stages of development.38  The family sphere, 
in additional to the social sphere and the politics sphere, would be an important arena to 
understand both genders’ development history.39 
 
5.3 Other French Development Process 
Based on our benchmark simulation and historical facts, we highlight three additional 
features of French development process.  The first is the absence of a Post-Malthusian regime.  
Galor and Weil (2000) defined Malthusian regime as a status where “income per capita was 
roughly constant” (806), Post-Malthusian regime as a status where “[i]ncome per capita grew”, 
while the “[positive] relationship between income per capita and population growth was still in 
place” (807), and Modern Growth regime as a status where “sustained income growth” occurs, and 
“there is a negative relationship between the level of output and the growth rate of population” 
(806).  In our simulation, per capita income was falling (or stagnating) up till AD1780, while 
population growth rate declined only after AD1760.  There is not a period when per capita 
income and population growth rate rose simultaneously.  France transited directly from the 
Malthusian regime to the Modern Growth regime.  Hence our model points out that a nation 
needs not go through the three-regime development process described by Galor and Weil (2000) 
and Galor and Moav (2002) within a unified growth framework (section 2.1). 
Second, we note the distinction between French and British development processes.  The 
French Demographic Revolution began in the late-eighteenth century and its Industrial Revolution 
in the nineteenth century, whereas the chronology was reversed in Britain (Chesnais 1992, 321).  
The chronology suggests that France relied more on fertility reduction as a way to raise its per 
capita income in comparison to Britain at the turn of the nineteenth century.  Actually, this 
statement generalizes well into the early-twenty-first century.  Using Maddison (2008)’s 
estimates, France indeed outperformed Britain in terms of economic growth during 
AD1820-AD2008.  Their annualized per capita income growth rates were 1.59% and 1.41% 
model) differs from men’s social history (reflected by 1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡). 
37 The U-shaped evolution of female labor-force participation was also evidential in the United 
States time series study (Goldin 1990, 1995), cross-sectional analysis (Mammen and Paxson 2000) 
and panel data regression (Tam 2001). 
38 In our model, there is no sex discrimination in the labor market, and women’s power depends 
solely on spouses’ relative incomes. 
39 Marx and Engels (1910[1848], 37) criticized bourgeois family system’s exploitation of women: 
“The bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production.  He hears that the 
instruments of production are to be exploited in common, and, naturally, can come to no 
other conclusion, than that the lot of being common to all will likewise fall to the women.” 
Engels (1909[1902], 98) argued that, only after the abolition of capitalism and the property 
relations created by it, could full freedom of marriage be attained. 
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respectively.  One reason behind this was that France had better demographic control than Britain.  
Within AD1820-AD2008, the French annualized population growth rate was 0.38%, compared 
with 0.56% in Britain.  This French development style seems to have emerged by the turn of the 
nineteenth century.  In the long run, it has not put the prosperity of the country at a disadvantage 
when compared to the other side of the English Channel.  In AD2008, per capita incomes of 
France and Britain were similar, at $22,223 and $23,742 respectively.40 
Lastly, we note that the French Revolution occurred in AD1789.  The French Revolution 
did not break out in a period when the society and the economy were static – as Tocqueville (1856, 
215) noted, “[n]o one in 1780 had any idea that France was on the decline; on the contrary, there 
seemed to be no bounds to its progress”.  This is consistent with relative deprivation theory 
(Morrison 1971, 688; Gurr 2011): rebellion and revolution occur at times when social changes that 
“create expectations faster than opportunities for reaching the expectations are created, resulting in 
relative deprivation”.  France was experiencing rapid socio-demographic-economic changes in 
the late-eighteenth century that caught the old political regime at a catastrophe. 
 
5.4 Extended model with innovation 
To generate sustainable per capita income growth in the long run, solely relying on 
learning-by-doing is not enough; we need the economy to innovate.41  North (1981, 162) stated 
that: 
“Learning by doing can explain the technology developed during the Industrial Revolution, 
but only scientific experimentation can account for the development of nuclear power or the 
petrochemical industry ... [in] the last hundred years”. 
Since the late-nineteenth century, there has been a proliferation of science-based 
technological breakthroughs which improved agricultural and manufacturing productivities.  For 
example, during the Second Industrial Revolution (AD1870-AD1914), in agriculture, the extended 
uses of chemical fertilizers, steel implements and tractors improved productivity of food supply.  
In manufacturing, the production of cheap steel, explosives and dynamite revolutionized 
construction processes.  The use of electricity provided an efficient supply of industrial power.  
Oil cracking provided gasoline and lubricants.  The invention of the internal combustion engine 
fostered development of the automobile industry.42 
We consider a simple extension of the benchmark model.  We incorporate innovation in the 
form of exogenous sectoral productivity growth since the Second Industrial Revolution.  As 
exogenous productivity growth are “measure[s] of our ignorance” (Abramoritz 1956, 11), they 
capture all factors other than learning-by-doing that could raise factor productivities in the two 
sectors (for example, improvements in transportation, finance, health, education, institution, and so 
40 Lévy-Leboyer (1964) was probably the first to stress that France followed a modernization path 
distinct from the British one.  Adapting to economic disasters during the revolutionary and 
Napoleonic periods, unfavorable factor endowments and its comparative advantage in skilled labor, 
France first developed its quality, fashion and luxury goods industries in the early-nineteenth 
century, and integrated backwards to modernize its basic industries later (Crouzet 2003, 224-225). 
41 In technical terms, the requirement for the model to exhibit long-run growth is the possession of 
a difference equation that is linear (Jones 2005, 1103). 
42 See Mokyr (1998) and Vaclav (2005) for surveys on the Second Industrial Revolution. 
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forth).  Technological progress equations (12) and (15) are replaced by: 
(25)  � 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝜂𝜂𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴        𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1400 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1859𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1860 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  , 𝜂𝜂 > 0 ; 
(26)  � 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝜅𝜅𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1400 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1859𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1860 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  , 𝜅𝜅 > 0 , 
where 𝜂𝜂 and 𝜅𝜅 are exogenous innovation rates in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors 
respectively.  We choose 𝜂𝜂 = (1.037)20 − 1 and 𝜅𝜅 = (1.052)20 − 1 .  See Appendix 2 for 
how these values are derived. 
 Figure 9 (red dashed lines) depicts the simulation results for the extended model.  We pay 
attention to how the inclusion of innovation affects the simulated development paths after AD1860.  
Innovation refueled productivity growth in the two sectors which otherwise began to exhaust their 
momentum due to diminishing learning-by-doing (panels (c) and (d)).  It allowed sustainable per 
capita income growth (panel (a)), which in turn promoted the continuous rise in women’s 
labor-force participation rate and power [Mechanism 1] (panels (g) and (h)).  Through the 
strengthened income effect and female empowerment effect [Mechanisms 1 and 5], these further 
reduced fertility and agricultural employment share (panels (b) and (e)).43 
 After incorporating innovation, our model predicts per capita income in France would grow 
by a factor of 24.1 throughout AD1820 to AD2000, which is a bit larger than the factor 18.0 
implied by Maddison (2008)’s estimates.  Innovation has become a more and more important 
engine of growth in France, as panel (a) shows that the simulated per capita income gap between 
the benchmark model (with only learning-by-doing) and the extended model (with 
learning-by-doing and innovation) widened as time goes by in the late-nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.  This conforms to Acemoglu et al. (2006)’s argument that innovation rather than 
imitation would become a more important source of growth when a country moves closer to the 
world technology frontier, which describes France at least since the mid-twentieth century.44 
To conclude, innovation has been the key to sustainable economic growth in France since 
the late-nineteenth century.  It has also contributed to the rises in women’s labor-force 
participation and power, as well as declines in fertility, agricultural employment share and relative 
food price. 
 
5.5 Female empowerment as development decelerator 
Using the extended model, we perform a counterfactual experiment to test the implication of 
imposing social norms that act against the rise in feminism.45  Suppose that in the counterfactual 
patriarchy economy, the wife always conforms to her husband’s preference.  In terms of our 
43 The weakness of the extended model is that it predicts a counterfactual drop in relative food 
price during AD1860-AD1920 (panel (f)).   
44  Wolff (1991) found evidence for TFP-convergence among G7 countries during 
AD1870-AD1979.  In particular, in AD1950 French TFP was 0.54 of the United States level.  In 
AD1979 its TFP level was nearly on par with the United States level. 
45 The World Bank (2006, 51-54) stated that one cause of gender inequality is the “inequality trap”, 
in which the social norms reinforce the existing segmented roles between women and men: the 
female is delineated for homecare and housework; the male is for market work and social 
interactions.  This reinforces women and men’s different access to assets and opportunities, 
hampering women’s ability to influence household decisions. 
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model, we reset 𝛾𝛾1 = 𝛾𝛾2 = 3.4 in Table 1.  Figure 11 (green dotted lines) depicts the evolution 
of per capita income and fertility for the patriarchy economy during AD1400-AD2100.  Note that 
the red dashed lines replicate the results from Figure 9 (extended model). 
INSERT FIGURE 11 HERE 
Figure 11 shows that, the patriarchy economy (green dotted lines) underwent Demographic 
Revolution and Industrial Revolution earlier.46  This is the implication of male quantity-biased 
reproductive preference together with learning-by-doing.  As husbands desire more children than 
wives, giving husbands absolute power in making household decisions would raise fertility and 
population stock in the economy when compared to the cooperative bargaining case.  The larger 
population stock would intensify output production and accelerate learning-by-doing, eventually 
allow the patriarchy economy to take off earlier.  In other words, female empowerment acts as a 
build-in decelerator for development process in our model. 
 
 To summarize section 5, we have applied the unified growth model with female 
empowerment to France.  Female empowerment is determined along with 
demographic-economic aggregates of a nation.  Our model replicates the key features of French 
development process, including the chronologies of Demographic and Industrial Revolutions, 
women’s distinctive fall-and-rise socio-economic status (female labor-force participation, income 
and power), the absence of a Post-Malthusian regime, the role of fertility control and innovation in 
French modern growth.  Female empowerment also acts as a development decelerator. 
 
 
6 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
In this section, we employ the unified growth model to examine four development policies: 
preferential treatment, reducing child-rearing cost, promoting agricultural innovation and 
promoting manufacturing innovation on Madagascar.  Madagascar is a former French colony and 
is still stuck in the Malthusian Trap nowadays.  Table 3 shows the comparison of per capita 
income, population size and land area in AD1500 France and AD2000 Madagascar.   It is 
interesting to observe the similarity of the three aspects in France five hundred years ago and in 
AD2000 Madagascar. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
We assume the two countries share the same parameter values and directly apply the 
calibrated benchmark model from section 5.1 to Madagascar.  What we need to change is just the 
time frame, from AD1400-AD2100 to AD1900-AD2600 (five hundred years delay).  By doing so 
we have implicitly assumed that learning-by-doing is the sole engine of growth in Madagascar 
today. 
Figure 12A (blue solid lines) depicts the simulated development paths for Madagascar from 
AD1900 to AD2600.  Basically it is just the evolution paths in Figure 9 (blue solid lines) being 
46 The counterfactual economy went through the Demographic and Industrial Revolutions in 
AD1760 and AD1800, 20 years earlier than the extended model in section 5.4 did. 
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delayed by five hundred years.  We take this as the “baseline case” in Madagascar.  We then 
consider the four aforementioned policy options.  We will pay particular attention on the policy 
effects on Madagascar’s economic (per capita income) and gender equality development, which 
are summarized in Table 4. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
The bidirectional relationship between women and development we highlighted in section 4.6 
[Mechanisms 1, 2, 5] will be key to explaining the simulation results. 
 
6.1 Policy 1: Preferential treatment 
We first consider the effect of preferential treatment. 47   Consider a policy which 
exogenously raises women’s bargaining power for given male and female labor-force participation 
rates by 10% since AD2000.  In terms of our model, we modify (6) by: 
(27)  �
𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 = 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡1+𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 = 1.1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡1+𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡        𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1900 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1999𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2000 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  . 
 Figure 12A (red dashed lines) depicts the policy effect.  While the policy improves 
women’s power since AD2000 (panel (h)), there is visually no effect on Madagascar’s 
development process (panels (a)-(g)).  Actually economic development first accelerates a bit, 
because of fertility decline resulting from the female empowerment effect [Mechanism 5].  It then 
slows down relative to the baseline case, due to the adverse impact of smaller population size on 
learning-by-doing. 
INSERT FIGURE 12A HERE 
Comparing panel (h) in Figure 9 and Figure 12A, promoting sustainable economic growth 
would be a more effective approach than preferential treatment to improve women’s power in the 
long run.  This corresponds to Doepke and Tertilt (2009)’s conclusion that gender equality might 
be achieved more easily through promoting economic development (for example public school 
program) than imposing legal reforms on women’s rights. 
 
6.2 Policy 2: Reducing child-rearing cost 
We then consider the effect of reducing child-rearing cost. 48   Suppose the policy 
successfully lowers the time cost per child by 10% since AD2000.  We set: 
(28)  � 𝜑𝜑 = 0.255
𝜑𝜑 = 0.255 × 0.9       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1900 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1999𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2000 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  . 
 Figure 12A (green dotted lines) depicts the policy effect.  The policy liberates women’s 
time into market work and female labor-force participation rate increases (panel (g)).  Together 
with the resulting initial rise in fertility, aggregate labor hours supplied rise.  Through 
47 Policy options to exogenously raise women’s power include reforming laws over property 
within marriage, increasing women’s exit options, eliminating discriminatory inheritance laws and 
wisdoms, and reducing domestic violence (The World Bank 2012, ch.7). 
48 Policy options to reduce child-rearing cost include subsidies to child care services, expansion of 
universal public school facilities, integrated health services for children, and so forth. (The World 
Bank 2012, ch.7). 
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learning-by-doing, technological progresses in both sectors accelerate (panels (c) and (d)).  As a 
result Demographic Revolution and Industrial Revolution set in earlier (panels (b) and (a)), 
enabling the economy to enjoy a superior per capita income growth path (panel (a)).  Gender 
equality is enhanced in both the short run and long run [Mechanism 1] (panel (h)). 
 The key drive to female empowerment in this case is the liberation of women’s time to 
market work.  This is analogous to Greenwood et al. (2005)’s finding that the flood of new 
household durables in the United States during the twentieth century freed up women’s time from 
housework, and explained more than half of the observed rise in female labor-force participation 
rate. 
 
6.3 Policy 3: Promoting agricultural innovation 
We consider the effect of promoting domestic agricultural innovation, or facilitating 
importation of foreign agricultural innovation into Madagascar.49  In particular, consider a policy 
that permanently introduces an innovation term into the agricultural technological progress 
equation (12) since AD2000: 
(29)  �
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴   𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓   𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡  
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 0.1𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴   𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓   𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 0.1 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡        𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1900 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1999𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2000 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  . 
The economy possesses an exogenous agricultural productivity growth rate of 10% in each period 
from AD2000 onwards. 
 Figure 12B (red dashed lines) depicts the policy effect.  In the short run, the enhanced 
agricultural technological progress exacerbates the decline in relative food price (panel (f)), 
thereby encouraging fertility increase [Mechanism 2] (panel (b)).  The fertility increase also 
causes a faster drop in female labor-force participation rate (panel (g)), creating conflicting effects 
on learning-by-doing.  The net effect is that per capita income growth first decelerates, and picks 
up later (panel (a)).  Similarly, women’s power declines in the short run, and rises in the long run 
[Mechanism 1] (panel (h)). 
INSERT FIGURE 12B HERE 
 In reality, the effect of agricultural innovation on gender equality may depend on the type of 
agriculture getting a boost.  Qian (2008) found that, in the early Chinese reform period 
(AD1978-AD1980), reforms increased the returns to tea and orchard crops.   In areas suitable for 
tea cultivation, female survival rate and education attainment rose.  In areas suitable for orchard 
cultivation, the opposite was true. 
 
6.4 Policy 4: Promoting manufacturing innovation 
Lastly we consider the effect of promoting domestic manufacturing innovation, or boosting 
importation of foreign manufacturing innovation into Madagascar.50  Similar to section 6.3, 
49 The World Bank (2008, 176) suggested that research aiming at improving crop, soil, water, 
livestock management and developing location-specific agricultural systems are crucial in 
fostering productivity growth in agriculture. 
50 UNIDO (2013, ch.7) stated that governments could promote industrial innovation by financing 
and providing public innovation inputs or information, establishing strong links between research 
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consider a policy that permanently introduces an innovation term into the manufacturing 
technological progress equation (15) since AD2000: 
(30)  �
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀    𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓   𝑔𝑔𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 0.1𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀   𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓   𝑔𝑔𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 0.1 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1900 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1999𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2000 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  . 
The economy enjoys an exogenous manufacturing productivity growth rate of 10% in each period 
from AD2000 onwards. 
 Figure 12B (green dotted lines) depicts the policy effect.  In general promoting 
manufacturing innovation (green dotted lines) has opposite dynamic effects on development when 
compared to promoting agricultural innovation (red dashed lines).  The crux lies in their opposite 
effect on relative food price (panel (f)).  Relative to the baseline case, policy 4 pushes up relative 
food price, and discourages fertility in the short run [Mechanism 2] (panel (b)).  The resulting 
smaller population scale slows down learning-by-doing in the agricultural sector (panel (c)) and 
eventually in the manufacturing sector (panel (d)); per capita income soon suffers.  Although 
women’s power rises sharply in the short run (panel (h)), it is outperformed by the baseline case in 
the long run [Mechanism 1].   
 The short run impact of non-agricultural innovation on gender equality is historically 
significant.  Goldin (2006, 5) stated that, the arrival of new types of information technology in 
the United States since the AD1900s raised the demand for office and other clerical workers, 
leading to the revolutionary increase in married women’s labor-force participation in the 
early-twentieth century. 
 
We summarize the four policies: in terms of promoting gender equality, only preferential 
treatment and reducing child-rearing cost are feasible policy options in both the short and long run.  
If the society also cares about long-run economic development, the latter is the preferred option for 
Madagascar. 51   The lesson from the above experiments is that, within a co-evolving 
socio-demographic-economic system, some development policies may bring about negative 
spillovers through dynamic general equilibrium effects, and can render themselves useless in 
addressing the issues they were intend to solve in the long run; the manufacturing innovation 





7.1 Women and Development 
The central theme of this paper is that female empowerment is linked together with 
demographic-economic variables in a dynamic system.  We highlight the bidirectional 
institutions and enterprises, acting as a consumer to raise demand in strategically important 
industries. 
51 Note that Figure 9 demonstrates that, some policy mix, such as simultaneously promoting 
agricultural and manufacturing innovations, can also improve gender equality and expedite 
economic development in both the short and long run. 
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relationship between women and development (section 4.6).  Without female empowerment, 
unified growth theories would miss out one critical event - the rise of women, that has come along 
with industrialization and demographic transition, and affected at least half of the population in 
developed countries (e.g. France) in the past two centuries, and is relevant for present-day policy 
formulation in developing countries (e.g. Madagascar). 
We model gender equality as an equilibrium phenomenon within a unified growth framework.  
Diebolt and Perrin (2013a, 2013b) did so by emphasizing women’s human capital acquisition in 
response to skill-biased technological progress in the development process.  In this paper, our 
emphasis is on women’s labor-force participation response to changes in general wage and relative 
price throughout development.  What is similar in our theory and theirs is that the opportunity 
cost of having children will eventually rise and trigger fertility decline.  Although our model does 
not include the human capital acquisition channel, it does a good job in matching French 
development patterns up till the mid-nineteenth century (section 5.1), especially with regard to the 
fall and rise of women (section 5.2) and the absence of a Post-Malthusian regime (section 5.3).  
We think Diebolt and Perrin (2013a, 2013b)’s human capital acquisition channel would become 
more important as France came to the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries when innovation, a 
skill-intensive activity, became the key engine of growth (section 5.4).52 
On the issue of long-run gender equality, our model gives an unpleasant implication: 
biological differences between women and men means that complete gender equality is not 
achievable, as long as we do not have zero fertility (i.e. humans become extinct).  Perhaps the 
best policies to promote gender equality and economic development together are those that 
facilitate innovations in both sectors (section 5.4) and reduce child-rearing cost (section 6.2), 




Last but not least, we highlight three limitations of our model.  First, one crucial assumption 
in our analysis is that women’s power depends solely on their income relative to men’s income 
(equation (6)).  In reality, women’s power also depends on political and civil rights, equal 
opportunities to jobs and financial services, property rights on assets, education and training, 
access to information and networks, and so forth.  If we take these factors into account, it is likely 
that, since industrialization, women’s power has been rising faster in France (developed countries) 
than what our model predicts in section 5. 
Second, our unified growth model does not aim to provide a one-size-fits-all evaluation on 
development policies in different countries nowadays (Rodrik 2010).  Our model assumes 
nearly-perfect labor and goods markets.53  In reality different countries are bound by different 
52 From regression analysis, Murphy (2015) found that education had a significant negative 
impact on French marital fertility during AD1876-AD1896.  Employing an augmented Solow 
model, Mankiw et al. (1992) found that human capital was an important component to explain 
cross-country variation in standard of living during AD1960-AD1985. 
53 In our model, labor market is not exactly perfect – wages are set according to average product 
rather than marginal product.  Ho (2016b) showed that a unified growth model with a similar 
setting to ours could replicate British and Chinese historical demographic-economic development. 
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constraints related to gender equality and economic development issues.  Some might face severe 
sex discrimination in job markets, while others might suffer from poor public infrastructure to 
improve economic conditions.  To some degree our model acts as a benchmark framework to 
explain or forecast long-run socio-demographic-economic development in a country without 
market imperfection.  Still, we believe that our work has unearthed the dynamic interactions 
between selected social, demographic and economic aggregates that could shed light on 
development policy formulation in global South countries. 
Third, as we emphasize throughout the paper, many results, including female empowerment 
as a development decelerator, depend on our model setting that learning-by-doing is the sole 
engine of growth (equations (12) and (15)).  In reality, we can think of channels where female 
empowerment can enhance economic growth.  For example, empowered women might invest 
more in their children’s health and education, have more access to credit and lending services, 
participate more in formal sector activities, and so forth.  Once we incorporate these factors into 
unified growth theories, how female empowerment and economic growth interact and co-evolve 
will become a more complicated issue that demands further research.54  What our paper points to 
is that we should think about this kind of issues from long-run and general equilibrium 
perspectives, and not overemphasize short run gender and economic outcomes at the cost of their 
long-run counterparts.  We do not just demand sustainable economic growth, but also sustainable 





This paper demonstrates that the advent of feminism is an integral component of 
development.  The rise of women went along with industrialization and demographic change, and 
their effects persist till today.  We develop a two-sector bisexual unified growth model with 
intra-household bargaining and structural transformation to link these historical episodes together. 
Our model highlights the bidirectional relationship between women and development.  In 
one direction, female empowerment would affect fertility, sectoral shift and decelerate 
development.  Given that women desire fewer children, the rise of women’s power reduces 
fertility and aggregate demand for food.  This draws labor hours out of agriculture, decelerating 
agricultural technological progress.  The resulting higher relative food price evolution path would 
further check population growth and productivity growth in the long run.  In the other direction, 
development that checks fertility, including wage increases and relative food price rises, would 
raise female labor-force participation and hence women’s power. 
We apply the model to replicate French socio-demographic-economic development.  During 
AD1400-AD1780, the Iron Law of Wages was operative.  Technological progress was slow and 
translated into population growth, trapping French per capita income at the Malthusian level.  At 
around the time of the French Revolution, the accelerated productivity growth turned per capita 
54  For example, taking the mentioned factors into account, whether female empowerment 
accelerates or decelerates development will become a parameter as well as an empirical issue. 
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income growth positive.  The resulting wage increases incentivized women to participate in the 
labor market and checked fertility, marking the era of Demographic Revolution and Rise of 
Women.  France did not go through a Post-Malthusian regime: its Industrial Revolution (AD1820) 
occurred later than its Demographic Revolution (AD1780).  Fertility control has been a key 
instrument for France to support its per capita income growth since the turn of the nineteenth 
century.  After the twentieth century, innovation has replaced learning-by-doing as the key engine 
of French economic growth.  We restored women to development history (bidirectional 
women-development relationship) and restored development history to women (distinctive 
U-shaped evolution of women’s socio-economic status: labor-force participation, income and 
power). 
We then examine the policy implications.  We apply the model to Madagascar, a former 
French colony, to study four development policies (preferential treatment, reducing child-rearing 
cost, promoting agricultural innovation and promoting manufacturing innovation).  Taking 
dynamic general equilibrium interactions among socio-, demographic-, and economic variables 
into account, only the policy that reduces child-rearing cost can promote gender equality and 
economic development in both the short and long run.  Unless we can eliminate the portion of 
child-rearing cost that is entirely borne by women, complete gender equality is not achievable in 
the long run.  Exogenous preferential treatment to fix gender outcomes might bring along 
unintentional, negative consequences on long-run development. 
“Where are the women?” This is usually the first question feminists ask in their research.  
Similar questions could be raised in economics research.  For example, what evidence would 
advance the claim that economic structures are gender-biased?  What are the impetus and 
mechanisms that perpetuate or unlock these gender structures?  How do family, society, state, and 
the world contribute to the changing gender responsibilities in production and reproduction?  
Constituting half of a nation’s population, women and their power are important ingredients of 
understanding the growth of nations from a more comprehensive perspective.  The wealth of 
nations by itself is a complicated-enough economic issue.  Once we realize that it also interacts 
with social issues like women’s security and opportunities, how we define the welfare of a nation 
and improve it will remain an exciting and challenging area that deserves future study.  Hopefully 
our paper sheds light on thinking about these issues from long-run and general equilibrium 
perspectives, and contributes to considerations that countries, especially those in the global South, 
should ponder when formulating development policies today. 
 
 
Appendix 1:  Balance growth path in benchmark model 
 
The balanced growth path (BGP) is defined as a steady state in the economy where the 
growth rates and sectoral labor hours shares are constant.  Define the value of variable 𝒁𝒁 




.  Given 𝜶𝜶 + 𝜺𝜺 ≠ 𝟏𝟏, 𝝓𝝓 ≠ 𝟏𝟏, we have 
29 
 
(a) (𝝀𝝀)∗ = 𝟏𝟏−𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐
𝟐𝟐−𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐
 , (𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭)∗ = 𝟏𝟏 − 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐, (𝒏𝒏)∗ = 𝟐𝟐.  
(b) (𝒈𝒈𝒁𝒁)∗ = 𝟎𝟎, = { 𝒀𝒀𝑨𝑨,𝒀𝒀𝑴𝑴,𝒀𝒀,𝒚𝒚,𝜽𝜽,𝒘𝒘,𝒑𝒑,𝑨𝑨,𝑴𝑴, 𝑭𝑭,𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑} . 
 
Proof: By the definition of BGP, �𝑔𝑔𝜃𝜃�
∗ = 0.  Constant population growth rate means adult 
population (𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡), adult work force (𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 �2−𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡2 �) and population (𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 + 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡2 ) grow at the same 
gross rate (𝑛𝑛)∗
2
 in BGP. 
Rewrite (12) as 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 ≡
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1−𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡
= 𝜇𝜇�𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)1−𝜀𝜀.  In BGP �𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡+1𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 �𝛼𝛼 �𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 �𝛼𝛼 = �𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 �1−𝜀𝜀. 














.  Combine the above two BGP equations and 
use �𝑔𝑔𝜃𝜃�
∗ = 0, we obtain (𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴)∗ = (𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹)∗.  Plug back to the first BGP equation, [1 + (𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹)∗]𝛼𝛼 =[1 + (𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹)∗]1−𝜀𝜀.  Given 𝛼𝛼 ≠ 1 − 𝜀𝜀, we have (𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹)∗ = 0.  Hence (𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴)∗ = 0 too. 
From (9), 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 2 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 2(1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹).  Hence (𝑛𝑛)∗ = 2[1 + (𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹)∗] = 2. 
By (15), 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 ≡
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1−𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
= 𝛿𝛿(1−𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡)𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡�2−𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡2 �(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)1−𝜙𝜙 .  In BGP �1−𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡+11−𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 � �𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 � = �𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 �1−𝜙𝜙 .  Since (𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹)∗ = (𝑔𝑔𝜒𝜒)∗ = 0, given 𝜙𝜙 ≠ 1, we have (𝑔𝑔𝑀𝑀)∗ = 0. 
From (24) (𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴)∗ = (𝑔𝑔𝑀𝑀)∗ = (𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹)∗ = 0 implies (𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝)∗ = 0. 
From (11) and (14), (𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴)∗ = (𝑔𝑔𝑀𝑀)∗ = �𝑔𝑔𝜃𝜃�∗ = (𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹)∗ = 0  implies �𝑔𝑔𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴�∗ = �𝑔𝑔𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀�∗ = 0 .  
With (𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝)∗ = 0, by (17) (𝑔𝑔𝑌𝑌)∗ = 0.  With (𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹)∗ = 0 and (𝑛𝑛)∗ = 2, by (18) (𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦)∗ = 0. 









+ 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 � = 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡(2−𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡)2+𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 .  Since (𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦)∗ = (𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛)∗ = 0, we obtain (𝑔𝑔𝑤𝑤)∗ = 0. 
From (7), (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃)∗ = 1 − 𝜑𝜑(𝑛𝑛)∗ = 1 − 2𝜑𝜑. 





Appendix 2:  Calibrating sectoral innovation rates 
 
In this section, we illustrate how to calibrate the agricultural innovation rate 𝜂𝜂 and the 
manufacturing innovation rate 𝜅𝜅 in (25) and (26).   
For both AD1856 and AD1991, we divide the industry money wages index (normalized to 
AD1975 price) (Mitchell 2007, 195-201) by consumer price indices (Mitchell 2007, 961-965) in 
France to obtain the real wages.  We proxy agricultural employments by economically active 
population in agriculture, forestry and fishing in France (Mitchell 2007, 153).  With the relative 
food price estimates from Figure 6, we plug in the real wages, agricultural employments and 
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benchmark parameter values from Table 1 into (22) to obtain 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 and 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 in AD1856 and in 
AD1991.  𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 and 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 grew by factors of 579 and 16,248 during AD1856-AD1991. 
From the benchmark simulation results in section 5.1 (with learning-by-doing as the sole 
engine of growth), agricultural and manufacturing productivities rose by factors of 4.26 and 16.87 
respectively during AD1860-AD2000.  So we deflate the above two growth factors by 4.26 and 
16.87; the growth factors in 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡  and 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡  that were not caused by learning-by-doing during 
AD1856-AD1991 were 136 and 963 respectively. 
 From these two growth factors, the annualized agricultural and manufacturing productivity 
growth rates not caused by learning-by-doing during AD1856-AD1991 were 3.7% and 5.2% 
respectively. Hence we take  𝜂𝜂 = (1.037)20 − 1  and 𝜅𝜅 = (1.052)20 − 1  as exogenous 
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Benchmark parameter and initial values, France, AD1400-AD2100 
 
 Interpretation Value 
Parameters   
𝜑𝜑 Wife’s time cost per child 0.289 
𝛾𝛾1 Wife’s preference for number of children 3 
𝛾𝛾2 Husband’s preference for number of children 3.4 
𝜇𝜇 Agricultural production function parameter 2.68 
𝜀𝜀 Diminishing returns to agricultural learning-by-doing 0.296 
𝛼𝛼 Diminishing returns to labor hours in agricultural sector 0.85 
𝛿𝛿 Manufacturing production function parameter 1.192 
𝜙𝜙 Diminishing returns to manufacturing learning-by-doing 0.23 
𝑇𝑇 Total amount of land 1 
   
Initial values   
𝐹𝐹1
1  Initial population of women 0.007 
𝐹𝐹1
2  Initial population of men 0.007 
𝐴𝐴1 Initial agricultural productivity level 0.01 





French development patterns to be matched 
 
 Industrial Revolution in AD1820 (criterion: annual per capita income growth rate > 0.55%) 
 Demographic Revolution in AD1780 (criterion: fertility starts its long-run decline) 
 Agricultural employment share was 61% in AD1760 
 Relative food price was rising throughout AD1820-AD1920 
 Female labor-force participation rate was 24% in AD1860 
 
 The above are consistent with development patterns shown in Figures 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 in section 3 






Comparison of AD1500 France and AD2000 Madagascar 
 
 AD1500 France AD2000 Madagascar 
Per capita income 
(AD1990 international dollars) 
727 695 
Population (thousand) 15,000 15,742 
AD2016 land area (sq. km) 549,970 581,540 
 












1.  Preferential 
treatment 
Exog.↑female bargaining 
power by 10% 
Accelerate at first, 
decelerate later 
Improve 
2.  Reducing 
child-rearing cost 
Exog.↓time cost per child 
by 10% 
Accelerate Improve 
3.  Promoting agri. 
innovation 
Permanently↑agricultural 
productivity growth rate by 
10% 
Decelerate at first, 
accelerate later 
Worsen at first, 
improve later 




growth rate by 10% 
Accelerate at first, 
decelerate later 
Improve at first, 
worsen later 
 
* Economic development is represented by per capita income evolution (𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡). 





Per capita income (in AD1990 international dollars) and its 10-year average growth rate, 
France, AD1000-AD2008 
    




Birth and Death rates per 1,000 population, France, AD1750-AD2003 
 
Source: Chesnais (1992) Table A1.1 and Table A3.1 for AD1750-AD1800 data.  Mitchell (2007)  




Agricultural productivity, France, AD1600-AD1800 
 







Real money wages in Industry, France, AD1840-AD1913 
 





Agricultural employment share, France, AD1750-AD1992 
 




Relative food price, France, AD1820-AD1992 
 
Source: Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1985) Tableaux A-IV for AD1820-AD1913 data.  
INSEE (2016), Food products price over Manufacturing products price with 1980 bases, viewed 1 






Female labor-force participation rate, France, AD1856-AD2012 
 
Source: Deldycke et al. (1969, 29-30) for AD1856-AD1965 data.  The Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis (2016), Labor Force Participation Rate for Women in France (DISCONTINUED), 





Gender gap index, France, AD1837-AD2013 
 
Source: Diebolt and Perrin (2013a) for AD1837-AD1961 estimates.  World Bank (2016), Gross 








Simulated development paths, France, AD1400-AD2100 
 
 
Note: Solid (blue) lines: benchmark model without innovation.  Dashed (red) lines: extended 
model with innovation.  Panels show (a) per capita income, (b) fertility, (c) agricultural 
productivity growth rate, (d) manufacturing productivity growth rate, (e) agricultural employment 
share, (f) relative food price, (g) female labor-force participation rate, and (h) women’s power 






Simulated women’s income versus men’s income, France, AD1400-AD2100 
 
 
Note: Panels show (a) women’s income 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, (b) men’s income 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 ∙ 1, (c) per capita 





Simulated development paths, patriarchy France, AD1400-AD2100 
 
 
Note: Dashed (red) lines: France with innovation, benchmark parameters from Table 1.  Dotted 
(green) lines: patriarchy France with innovation, γ1 = 3.4, otherwise benchmark parameters from 






Policy effects on Madagascar development process: policies 1 and 2, AD1900-AD2600 
 
 
Note: Solid (blue) lines: the baseline economy.  Dashed (red) lines: Economy with policy 1 – 
preferential treatment.  Dotted (green) lines: Economy with policy 2 – reducing child-rearing cost.  
Panels show (a) per capita income, (b) fertility, (c) agricultural productivity growth rate, (d) 
manufacturing productivity growth rate, (e) agricultural employment share, (f) relative food price, 






Policy effects on Madagascar development process: policies 3 and 4, AD1900-AD2600 
 
 
Note: Solid (blue) lines: the baseline economy.  Dashed (red) lines: Economy with policy 3 – 
promoting agricultural innovation.  Dotted (green) lines: Economy with policy 4 – promoting 
manufacturing innovation.  Panels show (a) per capita income, (b) fertility, (c) agricultural 
productivity growth rate, (d) manufacturing productivity growth rate, (e) agricultural employment 
share, (f) relative food price, (g) female labor-force participation rate, and (h) women’s power 
from AD1900 to AD2600. 
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